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Much has been made about the vote to leave the UK as being an 
expression of the desire of people to reassert national (British) 
sovereignty. This has been a view articulated by prominent Brexiteer 
politicians, such as Boris Johnson, who in trying to argue for a “liberal” 
Brexit (a la John Stuart Mill), evoked the notion that law-making could 
only be legitimately undertaken by “the people” as a “demos”. For 
Johnson, this “demos” is embodied in the UK as an organic nation-
state (and hence that the EU lacks legitimacy in this regard).  Hence, 
“only the nation can legitimise” obedience to laws[1] and Brexit 
represents as reassertion of the primacy of “Britons” as the demos to 
undertake this. It is thus of some pertinence to explore notions of 
“Britishness” and see how pervasive they are in the UK at large, 
today. 
In this regard, the 2011 Census (data available for England and 
Wales) provides data on ethnicity and identity. What is striking here, in 
contrast to Johnson’s purported Demos above, is that those who self-
identify as “British” (either to the exclusion of any other identity or in 
concert with another) now number a minority in the UK, with only 29% 
of respondents in England identifying themselves as British. In 
contrast, 70% identified themselves as “English”[2]. The divergence 
between London and the rest of England is also starkly apparent – 
and only in London did “Britishness” compete with “Englishness” as 
an identity; with 38% of respondents identifying as British, and 44% 
English (notably, given the cosmopolitan nature of London, “other” 
identities comprised 26%). The 2014 Scottish independence 
referendum also illustrated this divergence in a very dramatic fashion, 
with 45% of voters desiring to break away from the UK (Hearne and 
De Ruyter, 2018). In turn, an increasing sense of Englishness in 
England has also been accompanied by increasing resentment 
against the 1997 devolution settlement offered to Scotland (Jones et 
al., 2012). This was epitomised in the famous “West Lothian 
Question” (Bogdanor, 2010), whereby Scottish MPs could vote on 
English affairs, but not vice-versa, which prompted the Cameron 
Government to explore the prospect of “English votes for English 
laws” (Hayton, 2015) in the aftermath of the Scottish independence 
referendum. 
Thus, not surprisingly, these fault-lines between London, Scotland 
and the rest of the UK manifested in the Brexit vote (and for which the 
prior growth of “Englishness” could have been seen as a portent 
thereof), which was characterised by strong variations between the 
constituent “nations” of the UK, with Scotland and Northern Ireland in 
particular demonstrating a strong Remain vote share, alongside 
London. Thus it could be argued that the Brexit vote represents the 
reassertion of an English identity or Demos, rather than a British one, 
and thus that the UK is no more of an organic (or legitimate) political 
entity than the EU. As such, one could argue that nations are only one 
form of identity and, moreover, these identities are frequently 
changeable over time (Anderson, 1983). Hearne and De Ruyter 
(2018), writing in this vein argue that: 
“the logical corollary of Johnson’s argument is that the UK should be 
scrapped in favour of separate states for different nations [Demos]. 
Where that would leave the 25% of the population who do identify as 
British remains to be seen.”[3] 
Indeed. Post-referendum, there is an impasse (at the time of writing) 
over the status of the Northern Ireland border and Scottish (and 
Welsh) government dissatisfaction over perceived lack of consultation 
by the UK Government: i.e., of the “uncertainty surrounding… 
constitutional voice for the devolved institutions in Scotland and 
elsewhere” (McHarg and Mitchell, 2017). This in turn adds further 
impetus to the arguments of those who demand reunification on the 
island of Ireland, or of Scottish independence. Examined in this light, 
should Brexit come to pass (and possibly even if it does not), the 
future of the UK in surviving as a coherent political entity looks bleak. 
Such predictions are not new, with Tom Nairn having first penned 
“The Break-up of Britain” over 40 years ago (Nairn, 1977). However, 
Brexit, with the seemingly intractable constitutional issues generated 
in its wake, has given them renewed vigour (and added a renewed 
validity to Nairn’s arguments). As such, Budd (2018), considering the 
likely economic shock to Northern Ireland from a hard Brexit, argued 
that: 
“its future may lie in an All-Ireland solution. Ironically, the 
Conservative and Unionist government and its current support from 
the Democratic Unionist Party may create the conditions for a united 
Ireland and consequently the break-up on the union of the UK”. [4] 
If nothing else, this calls for an urgent, fundamental revisit to the 
debate as to the nature of the UK, and what form the “demos” within it 
(and consequent governance structures) should take, post-Brexit. 
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